EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

SEQUENTIAL TWO-PLAYER GAMES WITH AMBIGUITY

Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey

International Economic Review, 2004, vol. 45, issue 4, 1229-1261

Abstract: If players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster-Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We argue that our equilibrium can be used to define a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty. Copyright 2004 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Sequential two-player games with ambiguity (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Sequential Two-Player Games with Ambiguity (2003) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:45:y:2004:i:4:p:1229-1261

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0020-6598

Access Statistics for this article

International Economic Review is currently edited by Harold L. Cole

More articles in International Economic Review from Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing () and ().

 
Page updated 2021-07-09
Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:45:y:2004:i:4:p:1229-1261