Sequential two-player games with ambiguity

Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey

No 03-27, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: If players' beliefs are strictly non-additive, the Dempster-Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.

Keywords: Uncertainty-aversion; capacity; Dempster-Shafer rule; bargaining; signalling game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2758/1/dp03_27.pdf

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Journal Article: SEQUENTIAL TWO-PLAYER GAMES WITH AMBIGUITY (2004)
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