FOLK THEOREMS FOR INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES PLAYED BY ORGANIZATIONS WITH SHORT-LIVED MEMBERS

Hajime Kobayashi

International Economic Review, 2007, vol. 48, issue 2, 517-549

Abstract: We consider infinitely repeated games played by organizations with short-lived members. Each member enters the organization with no prior memory. He plays the role of taking actions for stage games in the first half of his lifetime. In the beginning of the second half, when a new member enters the organization, the existing member privately sends a message to the new member. He remains in the organization for the second half, and then retires from the game. We prove that folk theorems hold in this environment; that is, organizations essentially implement Fudenberg and Maskin strategies. Copyright 2007 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.

Date: 2007
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