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INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND U.S. R&D SUBSIDIES: A QUANTITATIVE WELFARE ANALYSIS

Giammario Impullitti

International Economic Review, 2010, vol. 51, issue 4, 1127-1158

Abstract: In the early 1970s U.S. firms were the uncontested world leaders in R&D investment in most manufacturing sectors. Later, led by Japan and Europe, foreign firms began to challenge American R&D leadership in many sectors of the economy. This period of increasing technological competition is contemporaneous with a substantial increase in U.S. R&D subsidies. What is the effect of the observed increase in international competition on U.S. welfare? How does foreign competition affect the optimal R&D subsidy in the United States, and, consequently, how far is this from the subsidy observed in the data? This article addresses these questions in a two-country quality ladder growth model.

Date: 2010
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http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00613.x

Related works:
Working Paper: International Competition and U.S. R&D Subsidies: A Quantitative Welfare Analysis (2008) Downloads
Working Paper: International Competition and U.S. R&D Subsidies: A Quantitative Welfare Analysis (2008) Downloads
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