GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION AS A DISINCENTIVE FOR TRANSNATIONAL TERROR? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer

International Economic Review, 2010, vol. 51, issue 4, 981-1002

Abstract: Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976–2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.

Date: 2010
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http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2010.00608.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis (2009)
Working Paper: Government decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical analysis (2009)
Working Paper: Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis (2009)
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