Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis

Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer

No 2699, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.

Keywords: terrorism; decentralization; federalism; governance quality; government effectiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H40 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION AS A DISINCENTIVE FOR TRANSNATIONAL TERROR? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (2010)
Working Paper: Government decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? An empirical analysis (2009)
Working Paper: Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis (2009)
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