Game Theoretic Analysis of Insurgent Attacks, Government Protection, and International Intervention

Kjell Hausken and Mthuli Ncube ()

International Journal of Strategic Decision Sciences (IJSDS), 2020, vol. 11, issue 1, 56-75

Abstract: This article describes how a government failing to protect against insurgents may or may not be rescued by the international community. We find that when intervention is less probable, the insurgent and government fight harder and the insurgent more likely succeeds. Conversely, when intervention is more probable, the insurgent fights less expecting subsequent intervention, and the government protects less expecting international community rescue. Higher contest intensities cause comparably matched players to fight harder. The international community intervenes if its unit intervention cost is low weighted against the benefits of intervention.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:igg:jsds00:v:11:y:2020:i:1:p:56-75

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