Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making

Clare Lombardelli, James Proudman and James Talbot
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Clare Lombardelli: Bank of England
James Talbot: Bank of England

International Journal of Central Banking, 2005, vol. 1, issue 1

Abstract: We report the results of an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision making under uncertainty. A large sample of economics students played a simple monetary policy game, both as individuals and in committees of five players. Our findings - that groups make better decisions than individuals - accord with previous work by Blinder and Morgan. We also attempt to establish why this is so. Some of the improvement is related to the ability of committees to strip out the effect of bad play, but there is a significant additional improvement, which we associate with players learning from each other’s interest rate decisions.

JEL-codes: C91 C92 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (88)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision Making (2005)
Working Paper: Committees versus individuals: an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making (2003)
Working Paper: Committees versus individuals: an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2005:q:2:a:5

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