Committees versus individuals: an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making

Clare Lombardelli, James Proudman and James Talbot
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Clare Lombardelli: Bank of England

No 142, Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 from Royal Economic Society

Abstract: We report the results of an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making under uncertainty. A large sample of economically literate students from the London School of Economics played a simple monetary policy game, as both individuals and committees of five players. Our findings - that groups make better decisions than individuals - accord with previous work by Blinder and Morgan. The experiment also attempted to establish why group decision-making is superior: although some improvement was related to committees taking decisions by majority voting, a significant additional committee benefit was associated with members being able to share information and observe each other's voting behaviour.

Keywords: monetary policy; experimental economics; central banking; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision-Making (2005)
Working Paper: Committees Versus Individuals: An Experimental Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision Making (2005)
Working Paper: Committees versus individuals: an experimental analysis of monetary policy decision-making (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecj:ac2003:142

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