Partnership Dissolution: Information and Efficiency+

Yuri Khoroshilov ()
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Yuri Khoroshilov: Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario K1N 6N5, Canada

Decision Analysis, 2018, vol. 15, issue 3, 133-138

Abstract: This paper analyses the efficiency of the Texas shootout and ½-auction partnership dissolution mechanisms when one of the partners has a chance to learn the other partner’s valuation. It shows that the efficiency of the Texas shootout mechanism positively depends on the probability of one partner successfully learning the other’s valuation while for the ½-auction mechanism such a relationship is not monotonic: The outcome is efficient when the probability of observing the other partner’s signal is zero or one, but is inefficient for all intermediate values.

Keywords: Texas shootout; ½-auction; partnership; divorce; theoretical model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:15:y:2018:i:3:p:133-138

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