Supporting Negotiations over Influence Diagrams

Jesus Rios () and David Rios Insua ()
Additional contact information
Jesus Rios: Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester M15 6PB, United Kingdom
David Rios Insua: Spanish Royal Academy of Sciences, 28004 Madrid, Spain

Decision Analysis, 2009, vol. 6, issue 3, 153-171

Abstract: We deal with issues concerning negotiation support for group decisions over influence diagrams, when the group members disagree about utility and probability assessments. We base our discussion on a modification of the balanced increment solution, which guarantees a final negotiated Pareto optimal alternative. As in standard decision analysis textbooks, we deal first with negotiation tables, then with negotiation trees, and finally with negotiation influence diagrams. We show through an example that a naive application of the balanced increment method at each joint decision node in a dynamic decision-making problem, and, more generally, of any standard negotiation approach guaranteeing Pareto optimality, may lead to an inferior solution. Therefore, our strategy proposes computing first the set of nondominated alternatives followed by negotiating over that set.

Keywords: group decision support; influence diagrams; decision trees; negotiation support; Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.1090.0152 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:6:y:2009:i:3:p:153-171

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Decision Analysis from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().