A Note on a Group Preference Axiomatization with Cardinal Utility

Luis Dias and Paula Sarabando ()
Additional contact information
Paula Sarabando: Polytechnic Institute of Viseu, 3504-510 Viseu, Portugal; and INESC Coimbra, 3000-033 Coimbra, Portugal

Decision Analysis, 2012, vol. 9, issue 3, 231-237

Abstract: Kenneth Arrow's work on social welfare proposed a set of conditions that a function to aggregate ordinal preferences of the members of a group should satisfy, proving that it was not possible to satisfy all these assumptions simultaneously. Later, Ralph Keeney adapted these conditions and proposed a cardinal utility axiomatization for the problem of aggregating the utility functions. This note discusses in particular the condition of nondictatorship. It proposes stronger formulations for this condition to limit the maximum influence that an individual can have, and it presents the corresponding characterization of compliant group cardinal utility functions. An extension to address coalitions of individuals acting strategically is also discussed.

Keywords: group utility functions; multiattribute utility theory; additive model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.1120.0244 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ordeca:v:9:y:2012:i:3:p:231-237

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Decision Analysis from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().