Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board

Steven Brams ()

Interfaces, 1990, vol. 20, issue 5, 67-80

Abstract: I designed a voting system for a professional association to ensure the equitable representation of different interests on its governing board. Approval voting, whereby voters can vote for as many candidates as they approve of, is combined with constraints on the numbers that can be elected from different categories of members to find the set of candidates most approved of by all voters, subject to the constraints.

Keywords: games/group decisions; programming; integer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD (1990)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:orinte:v:20:y:1990:i:5:p:67-80

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