Details about Steven J. Brams
Access statistics for papers by Steven J. Brams.
Last updated 2025-02-07. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pbr76
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Working Papers
2025
- Making Tennis Fairer: The Grand Tiebreaker
Papers, arXiv.org
2024
- Multi-Tier Tournaments: Matching and Scoring Players
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (1)
2023
- Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The $m-n$ Rule
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (1)
2021
- A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
See also Journal Article A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game, Games, MDPI (2020) View citations (1) (2020)
- Every Normal-Form Game Has a Pareto-Optimal Nonmyopic Equilibrium
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
See also Journal Article Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium, Theory and Decision, Springer (2022) View citations (1) (2022)
- Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black
Papers, arXiv.org 
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2021)
- Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness Is Impossible
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
See also Journal Article Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible, SN Operations Research Forum, Springer (2022) (2022)
- Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Compatible and Incompatible Properties
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2019
- Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
- How Lies Induced Cooperation in "Golden Balls:" A Game-Theoretic Analysis
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2018
- 3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting Algorithm
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Catch-Up: A Rule that Makes Service Sports More Competitive
Papers, arXiv.org View citations (6)
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2016) View citations (1)
- Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
See also Journal Article The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2022) (2022)
2017
- Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University View citations (2)
- Multi winner Approval Voting: An Apportionment Approach
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach, Public Choice, Springer (2019) View citations (7) (2019)
- Stabilizing unstable outcomes in prediction games
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (4)
2016
- Making the Rules of Sports Fairer
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
2015
- Catch-Up: A Game in Which the Lead Alternates
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
- Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2017) View citations (6) (2017)
- The Paradox of Grading Systems
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (4)
See also Journal Article The paradox of grading systems, Public Choice, Springer (2015) View citations (4) (2015)
2014
- An algorithm for the proportional division of indivisible items
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
- How to divide things fairly
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
- Voting power in the Electoral College: The noncompetitive states count, too
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2013
- Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (8)
- Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2012
- Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
2011
- A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
Also in Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics 
See also Journal Article A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2015) (2015)
- Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
See also Journal Article Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009, Public Choice, Springer (2014) (2014)
- N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (6)
- Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
See also Journal Article Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule, Journal of Theoretical Politics (2012) View citations (3) (2012)
- Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
- When does approval voting make the "right choices"?
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2010
- A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
- Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (2)
- Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
Also in Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2009)  Sustainable Development Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) (2009) 
See also Journal Article Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2013) (2013)
- Satisfaction approval voting
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (8)
See also Chapter Satisfaction Approval Voting, Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer (2014) View citations (10) (2014)
- Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
2009
- The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (2)
See also Journal Article The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2012) View citations (16) (2012)
2008
- Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
See also Chapter How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games, Springer Series in Game Theory, Springer (2009) View citations (4) (2009)
- Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
2007
- Stabilizing Power Sharing
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- The Instability of Power Sharing
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
See also Chapter The Instability of Power Sharing, Springer Books, Springer (2008) View citations (1) (2008)
2003
- Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations (5)
See also Journal Article Forming stable coalitions: The process matters, Public Choice, Springer (2005) View citations (12) (2005)
2002
- Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System
Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics View citations (5)
2000
- Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?
Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ
Also in Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques (2000) 
See also Journal Article Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2002) View citations (5) (2002)
1998
- Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Journal Article Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2000) View citations (26) (2000)
- Fallback Bargaining
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)
See also Journal Article Fallback Bargaining, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2001) View citations (15) (2001)
- Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Voting Procedures
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
See also Chapter Voting procedures, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier (2002) View citations (41) (2002)
1997
- Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
- Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
- The Truel
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (5)
- Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (31)
1996
- A Procedure for Divorce Settlements
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Journal Article Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem, Theory and Decision, Springer (1998) View citations (9) (1998)
- Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (6)
See also Journal Article Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair?, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International) (1996) View citations (6) (1996)
- Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- The Paradox of Multiple Elections
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Journal Article The paradox of multiple elections, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (1998) View citations (56) (1998)
1995
- A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Fair Division and Politics
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
- Game Theory and Emotions
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (18)
See also Journal Article GAME THEORY AND EMOTIONS, Rationality and Society (1997) View citations (12) (1997)
- How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Modeling Free Choice in Games
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
1994
- Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
- Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
- When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
1993
- Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Fair Division by Point Allocation
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
- Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1992
- An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (5)
- Cycles of Conflict
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (7)
- Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Journal Article Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International) (1993) View citations (11) (1993)
- Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
- Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1991
- A Generic Negotiation Game
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
See also Journal Article A Generic Negotiation Game, Journal of Theoretical Politics (1992) View citations (3) (1992)
- Arbitration Procedures
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (5)
- Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Games Theory and Literature
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Game Theory and Literature, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (1994) View citations (17) (1994)
- Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
See also Journal Article When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?, Rationality and Society (1993) View citations (5) (1993)
- Yes-No Voting
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1990
- APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)
See also Journal Article Approval Voting in Practice, Public Choice, Springer (1991) View citations (14) (1991)
- ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (14)
See also Journal Article Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board, Interfaces, INFORMS (1990) View citations (14) (1990)
- Sequential Arbitration Procedures
Working Papers, York (Canada) - Department of Economics View citations (2)
Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)
- THE BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
- UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1989
- COALITION VOTING
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
- CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1988
- ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Final-offer arbitration with a bonus, European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier (1991) View citations (10) (1991)
- OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
1987
- Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- National Security Games
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
See also Journal Article The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen, Public Choice, Springer (1988) View citations (20) (1988)
1986
- Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)
- The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- The Probability of Nuclear War
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
See also Journal Article The Probability of Nuclear War, Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo (1989) View citations (1) (1989)
- Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis, American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press (1987) View citations (6) (1987)
- Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1985
- Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- New Chairman Paradoxes
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Rational De-Escalation
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- The Path to Stable Deterrence
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
- Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)
1984
- Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
See also Journal Article Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best, Management Science, INFORMS (1986) View citations (28) (1986)
- Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Optimal Deterrence
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1983
- Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1982
- Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
- Threat Power in Sequential Games
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1981
- Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
1980
- Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
- Nonmyoptic Equilibria
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)
- Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries
Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (1982) View citations (6) (1982)
Journal Articles
2022
- Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium
Theory and Decision, 2022, 92, (2), 349-362 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper Every Normal-Form Game Has a Pareto-Optimal Nonmyopic Equilibrium, MPRA Paper (2021) (2021)
- Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)
Theory and Decision, 2022, 93, (1), 1-6 
Also in Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, 57, (1), 1-3 (2021)
- The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes
Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, 58, (2), 283-300 
See also Working Paper The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes, MPRA Paper (2018) View citations (3) (2018)
- Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible
SN Operations Research Forum, 2022, 3, (2), 1-23 
See also Working Paper Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness Is Impossible, MPRA Paper (2021) (2021)
2020
- A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game
Games, 2020, 11, (3), 1-7 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game, MPRA Paper (2021) (2021)
- Making Partisan Gerrymandering Fair: One Old and Two New Methods
Social Science Quarterly, 2020, 101, (1), 68-72
2019
- Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach
Public Choice, 2019, 178, (1), 67-93 View citations (7)
See also Working Paper Multi winner Approval Voting: An Apportionment Approach, MPRA Paper (2017) View citations (1) (2017)
2017
- Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2017, 26, (1), 115-131 View citations (6)
See also Working Paper Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items, MPRA Paper (2015) View citations (1) (2015)
- Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states
Public Choice, 2017, 170, (1), 99-113 View citations (1)
2015
- A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2015, 24, (3), 401-413 
See also Working Paper A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices, MPRA Paper (2011) (2011)
- The paradox of grading systems
Public Choice, 2015, 165, (3), 193-210 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper The Paradox of Grading Systems, MPRA Paper (2015) View citations (4) (2015)
2014
- Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009
Public Choice, 2014, 158, (3), 525-539 
See also Working Paper Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009, MPRA Paper (2011) (2011)
2013
- Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 41, (1), 1-18 
See also Working Paper Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation, MPRA Paper (2010) View citations (1) (2010)
2012
- Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2012, 24, (4), 507-525 View citations (3)
See also Working Paper Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule, MPRA Paper (2011) (2011)
- The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 39, (2), 615-631 View citations (16)
See also Working Paper The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items, MPRA Paper (2009) View citations (2) (2009)
2010
- A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, 60, (3), 191-195 View citations (1)
2008
- Proportional pie-cutting
International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, 36, (3), 353-367 View citations (12)
2007
- A minimax procedure for electing committees
Public Choice, 2007, 132, (3), 401-420 View citations (46)
- Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
Public Choice, 2007, 131, (3), 465-468 View citations (3)
2006
- Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election
Public Choice, 2006, 128, (3), 361-366 View citations (5)
- The normative turn in public choice
Public Choice, 2006, 127, (3), 245-250 View citations (4)
2005
- Efficient Fair Division
Rationality and Society, 2005, 17, (4), 387-421 View citations (21)
- Forming stable coalitions: The process matters
Public Choice, 2005, 125, (1), 67-94 View citations (12)
See also Working Paper Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters, Working Papers (2003) View citations (5) (2003)
- Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25, (2), 457-474 View citations (56)
See also Chapter Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting, Studies in Choice and Welfare, 2010, 19-37 (2010) View citations (4) (2010)
2004
- Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 48, (3), 251-269 View citations (20)
- Dividing the Indivisible
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2004, 16, (2), 143-173 View citations (6)
2003
- FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS
Theory and Decision, 2003, 55, (2), 147-180 View citations (17)
2002
- Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40, (2), 185-202 View citations (5)
See also Working Paper Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?, Cahiers de recherche (2000) (2000)
- Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2002, 14, (3), 359-383 View citations (25)
2001
- A nail-biting election
Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18, (3), 409-414 View citations (7)
- Competitive Fair Division
Journal of Political Economy, 2001, 109, (2), 418-443 View citations (36)
- Fallback Bargaining
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2001, 10, (4), 287-316 View citations (15)
See also Working Paper Fallback Bargaining, Working Papers (1998) View citations (2) (1998)
- Response to Randall Stone
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2001, 45, (2), 245-254 View citations (3)
2000
- Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (2), 247-267 View citations (26)
See also Working Paper Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity, Working Papers (1998) (1998)
- Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations
Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2000, 6, (2), 11 View citations (3)
1999
- AGREEMENT THROUGH THREATS: THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 1999, 01, (03n04), 251-265
- CATCH-22 AND KING-OF-THE-MOUNTAIN GAMES
Rationality and Society, 1999, 11, (2), 139-167 View citations (5)
1998
- Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
Theory and Decision, 1998, 45, (3), 263-289 View citations (9)
See also Working Paper Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem, Working Papers (1996) (1996)
- Proportional Representation
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1998, 10, (2), 147-178 View citations (4)
- The paradox of multiple elections
Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, 15, (2), 211-236 View citations (56)
See also Working Paper The Paradox of Multiple Elections, Working Papers (1996) (1996)
1997
- GAME THEORY AND EMOTIONS
Rationality and Society, 1997, 9, (1), 91-124 View citations (12)
See also Working Paper Game Theory and Emotions, Working Papers (1995) View citations (18) (1995)
1996
- Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair?
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1996, 15, (1), 99-112 View citations (6)
See also Working Paper Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?, Working Papers (1996) View citations (6) (1996)
- Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, 13, (4), 397-417 View citations (14)
1995
- Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence. Edited by Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt. Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1994. 213p. $74.95
American Political Science Review, 1995, 89, (2), 527-528
- When is Size a Liability?
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995, 7, (3), 301-316 View citations (10)
1994
- Game Theory and Literature
Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6, (1), 32-54 View citations (17)
See also Working Paper Games Theory and Literature, Working Papers (1991) View citations (1) (1991)
1993
- Intransigence in Negotiations
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1993, 37, (4), 692-708 View citations (6)
- Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1993, 12, (2), 1-39 View citations (11)
See also Working Paper Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples, Working Papers (1992) (1992)
- When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
Rationality and Society, 1993, 5, (4), 432-454 View citations (5)
See also Working Paper When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?, Working Papers (1991) View citations (1) (1991)
1992
- A Generic Negotiation Game
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1992, 4, (1), 53-66 View citations (3)
See also Working Paper A Generic Negotiation Game, Working Papers (1991) View citations (1) (1991)
- Putting the Other Side “On Notice†Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1992, 36, (3), 395-414 View citations (3)
1991
- Approval Voting in Practice
Public Choice, 1991, 71, (1-2), 1-17 View citations (14)
See also Working Paper APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE, Working Papers (1990) (1990)
- Comments on Scharpf's “Games Real Actors could Playâ€
Rationality and Society, 1991, 3, (2), 252-257
- Final-offer arbitration with a bonus
European Journal of Political Economy, 1991, 7, (1), 79-92 View citations (10)
See also Working Paper Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus, Working Papers (1988) View citations (1) (1988)
1990
- Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board
Interfaces, 1990, 20, (5), 67-80 View citations (14)
See also Working Paper CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD, Working Papers (1990) View citations (14) (1990)
1989
- The Probability of Nuclear War
Journal of Peace Research, 1989, 26, (1), 91-99 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper The Probability of Nuclear War, Working Papers (1986) View citations (1) (1986)
1988
- The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
Public Choice, 1988, 59, (2), 121-131 View citations (20)
See also Working Paper The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen, Working Papers (1987) View citations (1) (1987)
1987
- Optimal Threats
Operations Research, 1987, 35, (4), 524-536
- Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis
American Political Science Review, 1987, 81, (3), 833-850 View citations (6)
See also Working Paper Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, Working Papers (1986) View citations (1) (1986)
- Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1987, 31, (4), 547-572 View citations (2)
1986
- Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
Management Science, 1986, 32, (10), 1346-1355 View citations (28)
See also Working Paper Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best, Working Papers (1984) (1984)
1985
- Comment on The Problem of Strategic Voting under Approval Voting (Vol. 78, December 1984, pp. 952-958)
American Political Science Review, 1985, 79, (3), 816-818 View citations (1)
- Rejoinder to Niemi
American Political Science Review, 1985, 79, (3), 819-819 View citations (3)
- Response to Rabow
Management Science, 1985, 31, (3), 375-376
1984
- Comment on Wagner (Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 330-346)
American Political Science Review, 1984, 78, (2), 495-496
- Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences
Public Choice, 1984, 44, (3), 397-410 View citations (19)
1983
- Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
Management Science, 1983, 29, (8), 927-941 View citations (34)
1982
- Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries
Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982, 3, (4), 373-388 View citations (6)
See also Working Paper Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries, Working Papers (1980) View citations (1) (1980)
1981
- Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections
Public Choice, 1981, 36, (1), 89-114 View citations (13)
- Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting
Public Choice, 1981, 37, (3), 425-434 View citations (3)
- Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1981, 6, (1), 39-62 View citations (6)
1980
- Letter to the Editor—Authors' Rejoinder
Operations Research, 1980, 28, (4), 1024-1025
1979
- Replies
American Political Science Review, 1979, 73, (2), 552-553
1978
- Another Solution
American Political Science Review, 1978, 72, (4), 1365-1366
- Approval Voting
American Political Science Review, 1978, 72, (3), 831-847 View citations (144)
- Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
Operations Research, 1978, 26, (6), 966-991 View citations (11)
- Resource Allocations in the 1976 Campaign
American Political Science Review, 1978, 72, (4), 1362-1364
1977
- Deception in 2 × 2 Games
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1977, 2, (2), 171-203 View citations (3)
- The Network Television Game: There May be No Best Schedule
Interfaces, 1977, 7, (4), 102-109
- Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case
Public Choice, 1977, 32, (1), 67-83 View citations (2)
1975
- Comment on “Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College”
American Political Science Review, 1975, 69, (1), 155-156 View citations (2)
- Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1975, 19, (4), 596-612 View citations (12)
1974
- The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning*
American Political Science Review, 1974, 68, (1), 113-134 View citations (29)
- When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be
Public Choice, 1974, 17, (1), 11-25 View citations (1)
1973
- The Paradox of Vote Trading*
American Political Science Review, 1973, 67, (4), 1235-1247 View citations (73)
1971
- Comment on Mayer's “A Note on ‘An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies’”
American Political Science Review, 1971, 65, (3), 766-766
1970
- An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies*
American Political Science Review, 1970, 64, (2), 449-470 View citations (7)
1968
- Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. By Deutsch Karl W.. (New York: John Wileu & Sons, 1967. Pp. 167. $5.95.)
American Political Science Review, 1968, 62, (4), 1391-1392
- Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems
American Political Science Review, 1968, 62, (2), 461-475 View citations (6)
1966
- Transaction Flows in the International System*
American Political Science Review, 1966, 60, (4), 880-898 View citations (7)
Books
2012
- Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds, vol 1
MIT Press Books, The MIT Press View citations (1)
Also in MIT Press Books, The MIT Press (2011) View citations (21)
2002
- Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible, vol 1
MIT Press Books, The MIT Press View citations (3)
1996
- Fair Division
Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press View citations (26)
Edited books
2009
- The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer View citations (66)
Chapters
2021
- Peter Fishburn
Springer
2014
- Satisfaction Approval Voting
Springer View citations (10)
See also Working Paper Satisfaction approval voting, University Library of Munich, Germany (2010) View citations (8) (2010)
2010
- Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
Springer View citations (4)
See also Journal Article Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting, Springer (2005) View citations (56) (2005)
2009
- How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games
Springer View citations (4)
See also Working Paper How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games, University Library of Munich, Germany (2008) View citations (1) (2008)
- Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference
Springer View citations (28)
2008
- The Instability of Power Sharing
Springer View citations (1)
See also Working Paper The Instability of Power Sharing, University Library of Munich, Germany (2007) (2007)
2007
- Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures
A chapter in Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures, 2007 View citations (3)
2006
- How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting
Springer View citations (20)
2002
- Voting procedures
Chapter 04 in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 1, pp 173-236 View citations (41)
Also in Chapter 30 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 1994, vol. 2, pp 1055-1089 (1994) View citations (5)
See also Working Paper Voting Procedures, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1998) View citations (1) (1998)
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