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Details about Steven J. Brams

E-mail:steven.brams@nyu.edu
Homepage:http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/stevenbrams
Phone:(212) 998-8510
Postal address:Dept. of Politics New York University 19 West 4th St., 2nd Fl. New York, NY 10012 U.S.A.
Workplace:New York University

Access statistics for papers by Steven J. Brams.

Last updated 2025-02-07. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pbr76


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Working Papers

2025

  1. Making Tennis Fairer: The Grand Tiebreaker
    Papers, arXiv.org Downloads

2024

  1. Multi-Tier Tournaments: Matching and Scoring Players
    Papers, arXiv.org Downloads View citations (1)

2023

  1. Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The $m-n$ Rule
    Papers, arXiv.org Downloads View citations (1)

2021

  1. A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
    See also Journal Article A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game, Games, MDPI (2020) Downloads View citations (1) (2020)
  2. Every Normal-Form Game Has a Pareto-Optimal Nonmyopic Equilibrium
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
    See also Journal Article Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium, Theory and Decision, Springer (2022) Downloads View citations (1) (2022)
  3. Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black
    Papers, arXiv.org Downloads
    Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2021) Downloads
  4. Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness Is Impossible
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
    See also Journal Article Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible, SN Operations Research Forum, Springer (2022) Downloads (2022)
  5. Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Compatible and Incompatible Properties
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

2019

  1. Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (3)
  2. How Lies Induced Cooperation in "Golden Balls:" A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

2018

  1. 3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting Algorithm
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
  2. Catch-Up: A Rule that Makes Service Sports More Competitive
    Papers, arXiv.org Downloads View citations (6)
    Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2016) Downloads View citations (1)
  3. Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
  4. The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2022) Downloads (2022)

2017

  1. Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system
    Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University Downloads View citations (2)
  2. Multi winner Approval Voting: An Apportionment Approach
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach, Public Choice, Springer (2019) Downloads View citations (7) (2019)
  3. Stabilizing unstable outcomes in prediction games
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (4)

2016

  1. Making the Rules of Sports Fairer
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (3)

2015

  1. Catch-Up: A Game in Which the Lead Alternates
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (3)
  2. Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2017) Downloads View citations (6) (2017)
  3. The Paradox of Grading Systems
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article The paradox of grading systems, Public Choice, Springer (2015) Downloads View citations (4) (2015)

2014

  1. An algorithm for the proportional division of indivisible items
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
  2. How to divide things fairly
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (3)
  3. Voting power in the Electoral College: The noncompetitive states count, too
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

2013

  1. Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (8)
  2. Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

2012

  1. Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)

2011

  1. A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
    Also in Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics Downloads

    See also Journal Article A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2015) Downloads (2015)
  2. Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
    See also Journal Article Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009, Public Choice, Springer (2014) Downloads (2014)
  3. N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (6)
  4. Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
    See also Journal Article Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule, Journal of Theoretical Politics (2012) Downloads View citations (3) (2012)
  5. Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
  6. When does approval voting make the "right choices"?
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

2010

  1. A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
  2. Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (2)
  3. Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
    Also in Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2009) Downloads
    Sustainable Development Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) (2009) Downloads

    See also Journal Article Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2013) Downloads (2013)
  4. Satisfaction approval voting
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (8)
    See also Chapter Satisfaction Approval Voting, Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer (2014) View citations (10) (2014)
  5. Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (3)

2009

  1. The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2012) Downloads View citations (16) (2012)

2008

  1. Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
  2. How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Chapter How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games, Springer Series in Game Theory, Springer (2009) View citations (4) (2009)
  3. Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (3)

2007

  1. Stabilizing Power Sharing
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
  2. The Instability of Power Sharing
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
    See also Chapter The Instability of Power Sharing, Springer Books, Springer (2008) View citations (1) (2008)

2003

  1. Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
    Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Journal Article Forming stable coalitions: The process matters, Public Choice, Springer (2005) Downloads View citations (12) (2005)

2002

  1. Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System
    Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics Downloads View citations (5)

2000

  1. Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?
    Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques (2000) Downloads

    See also Journal Article Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2002) Downloads View citations (5) (2002)

1998

  1. Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2000) Downloads View citations (26) (2000)
  2. Fallback Bargaining
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article Fallback Bargaining, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2001) Downloads View citations (15) (2001)
  3. Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  4. To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  5. Voting Procedures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Chapter Voting procedures, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier (2002) Downloads View citations (41) (2002)

1997

  1. Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
  2. Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  3. Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
  4. The Truel
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (5)
  5. Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (31)

1996

  1. A Procedure for Divorce Settlements
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  2. Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem, Theory and Decision, Springer (1998) Downloads View citations (9) (1998)
  3. Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (6)
    See also Journal Article Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair?, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International) (1996) Downloads View citations (6) (1996)
  4. Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  5. The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  6. The Paradox of Multiple Elections
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article The paradox of multiple elections, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (1998) Downloads View citations (56) (1998)

1995

  1. A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  2. Fair Division and Politics
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
  3. Game Theory and Emotions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (18)
    See also Journal Article GAME THEORY AND EMOTIONS, Rationality and Society (1997) Downloads View citations (12) (1997)
  4. How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  5. Modeling Free Choice in Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)

1994

  1. Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
  2. Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  3. The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
  4. When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)

1993

  1. Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  2. Fair Division by Point Allocation
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
  3. Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1992

  1. An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (5)
  2. Cycles of Conflict
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  3. Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  4. Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (7)
  5. Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International) (1993) Downloads View citations (11) (1993)
  6. Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
  7. Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1991

  1. A Generic Negotiation Game
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article A Generic Negotiation Game, Journal of Theoretical Politics (1992) Downloads View citations (3) (1992)
  2. Arbitration Procedures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (5)
  3. Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  4. Games Theory and Literature
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Game Theory and Literature, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (1994) Downloads View citations (17) (1994)
  5. Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  6. When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?, Rationality and Society (1993) Downloads View citations (5) (1993)
  7. Yes-No Voting
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1990

  1. APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)

    See also Journal Article Approval Voting in Practice, Public Choice, Springer (1991) View citations (14) (1991)
  2. ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  3. CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (14)
    See also Journal Article Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board, Interfaces, INFORMS (1990) Downloads View citations (14) (1990)
  4. Sequential Arbitration Procedures
    Working Papers, York (Canada) - Department of Economics View citations (2)
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)
  5. THE BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
  6. UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1989

  1. COALITION VOTING
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
  2. CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1988

  1. ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  2. Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Final-offer arbitration with a bonus, European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier (1991) Downloads View citations (10) (1991)
  3. OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  4. Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)

1987

  1. Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  2. Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  3. National Security Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  4. The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen, Public Choice, Springer (1988) Downloads View citations (20) (1988)

1986

  1. Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  2. Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)
  3. The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  4. The Probability of Nuclear War
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article The Probability of Nuclear War, Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo (1989) Downloads View citations (1) (1989)
  5. Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis, American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press (1987) Downloads View citations (6) (1987)
  6. Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1985

  1. Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  2. Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  3. New Chairman Paradoxes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  4. Rational De-Escalation
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  5. The Path to Stable Deterrence
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
  6. Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)

1984

  1. Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best, Management Science, INFORMS (1986) Downloads View citations (28) (1986)
  2. Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  3. Optimal Deterrence
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1983

  1. Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  2. The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1982

  1. Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
  2. Threat Power in Sequential Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1981

  1. Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)

1980

  1. Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  2. Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
  3. Nonmyoptic Equilibria
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)
  4. Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (1982) Downloads View citations (6) (1982)

Journal Articles

2022

  1. Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium
    Theory and Decision, 2022, 92, (2), 349-362 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper Every Normal-Form Game Has a Pareto-Optimal Nonmyopic Equilibrium, MPRA Paper (2021) Downloads (2021)
  2. Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)
    Theory and Decision, 2022, 93, (1), 1-6 Downloads
    Also in Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, 57, (1), 1-3 (2021) Downloads
  3. The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, 58, (2), 283-300 Downloads
    See also Working Paper The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes, MPRA Paper (2018) Downloads View citations (3) (2018)
  4. Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible
    SN Operations Research Forum, 2022, 3, (2), 1-23 Downloads
    See also Working Paper Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness Is Impossible, MPRA Paper (2021) Downloads (2021)

2020

  1. A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game
    Games, 2020, 11, (3), 1-7 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game, MPRA Paper (2021) Downloads (2021)
  2. Making Partisan Gerrymandering Fair: One Old and Two New Methods
    Social Science Quarterly, 2020, 101, (1), 68-72 Downloads

2019

  1. Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach
    Public Choice, 2019, 178, (1), 67-93 Downloads View citations (7)
    See also Working Paper Multi winner Approval Voting: An Apportionment Approach, MPRA Paper (2017) Downloads View citations (1) (2017)

2017

  1. Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 2017, 26, (1), 115-131 Downloads View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items, MPRA Paper (2015) Downloads View citations (1) (2015)
  2. Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states
    Public Choice, 2017, 170, (1), 99-113 Downloads View citations (1)

2015

  1. A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 2015, 24, (3), 401-413 Downloads
    See also Working Paper A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices, MPRA Paper (2011) Downloads (2011)
  2. The paradox of grading systems
    Public Choice, 2015, 165, (3), 193-210 Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper The Paradox of Grading Systems, MPRA Paper (2015) Downloads View citations (4) (2015)

2014

  1. Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009
    Public Choice, 2014, 158, (3), 525-539 Downloads
    See also Working Paper Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009, MPRA Paper (2011) Downloads (2011)

2013

  1. Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 41, (1), 1-18 Downloads
    See also Working Paper Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation, MPRA Paper (2010) Downloads View citations (1) (2010)

2012

  1. Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2012, 24, (4), 507-525 Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule, MPRA Paper (2011) Downloads (2011)
  2. The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 39, (2), 615-631 Downloads View citations (16)
    See also Working Paper The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items, MPRA Paper (2009) Downloads View citations (2) (2009)

2010

  1. A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, 60, (3), 191-195 Downloads View citations (1)

2008

  1. Proportional pie-cutting
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, 36, (3), 353-367 Downloads View citations (12)

2007

  1. A minimax procedure for electing committees
    Public Choice, 2007, 132, (3), 401-420 Downloads View citations (46)
  2. Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
    Public Choice, 2007, 131, (3), 465-468 Downloads View citations (3)

2006

  1. Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election
    Public Choice, 2006, 128, (3), 361-366 Downloads View citations (5)
  2. The normative turn in public choice
    Public Choice, 2006, 127, (3), 245-250 Downloads View citations (4)

2005

  1. Efficient Fair Division
    Rationality and Society, 2005, 17, (4), 387-421 Downloads View citations (21)
  2. Forming stable coalitions: The process matters
    Public Choice, 2005, 125, (1), 67-94 Downloads View citations (12)
    See also Working Paper Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters, Working Papers (2003) Downloads View citations (5) (2003)
  3. Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25, (2), 457-474 Downloads View citations (56)
    See also Chapter Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting, Studies in Choice and Welfare, 2010, 19-37 (2010) View citations (4) (2010)

2004

  1. Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 48, (3), 251-269 Downloads View citations (20)
  2. Dividing the Indivisible
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2004, 16, (2), 143-173 Downloads View citations (6)

2003

  1. FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS
    Theory and Decision, 2003, 55, (2), 147-180 Downloads View citations (17)

2002

  1. Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40, (2), 185-202 Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?, Cahiers de recherche (2000) (2000)
  2. Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2002, 14, (3), 359-383 Downloads View citations (25)

2001

  1. A nail-biting election
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18, (3), 409-414 Downloads View citations (7)
  2. Competitive Fair Division
    Journal of Political Economy, 2001, 109, (2), 418-443 Downloads View citations (36)
  3. Fallback Bargaining
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 2001, 10, (4), 287-316 Downloads View citations (15)
    See also Working Paper Fallback Bargaining, Working Papers (1998) View citations (2) (1998)
  4. Response to Randall Stone
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2001, 45, (2), 245-254 Downloads View citations (3)

2000

  1. Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (2), 247-267 Downloads View citations (26)
    See also Working Paper Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity, Working Papers (1998) (1998)
  2. Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations
    Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2000, 6, (2), 11 Downloads View citations (3)

1999

  1. AGREEMENT THROUGH THREATS: THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE
    International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 1999, 01, (03n04), 251-265 Downloads
  2. CATCH-22 AND KING-OF-THE-MOUNTAIN GAMES
    Rationality and Society, 1999, 11, (2), 139-167 Downloads View citations (5)

1998

  1. Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
    Theory and Decision, 1998, 45, (3), 263-289 Downloads View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem, Working Papers (1996) (1996)
  2. Proportional Representation
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1998, 10, (2), 147-178 Downloads View citations (4)
  3. The paradox of multiple elections
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, 15, (2), 211-236 Downloads View citations (56)
    See also Working Paper The Paradox of Multiple Elections, Working Papers (1996) (1996)

1997

  1. GAME THEORY AND EMOTIONS
    Rationality and Society, 1997, 9, (1), 91-124 Downloads View citations (12)
    See also Working Paper Game Theory and Emotions, Working Papers (1995) View citations (18) (1995)

1996

  1. Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair?
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1996, 15, (1), 99-112 Downloads View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?, Working Papers (1996) View citations (6) (1996)
  2. Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, 13, (4), 397-417 View citations (14)

1995

  1. Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence. Edited by Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt. Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1994. 213p. $74.95
    American Political Science Review, 1995, 89, (2), 527-528 Downloads
  2. When is Size a Liability?
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995, 7, (3), 301-316 Downloads View citations (10)

1994

  1. Game Theory and Literature
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6, (1), 32-54 Downloads View citations (17)
    See also Working Paper Games Theory and Literature, Working Papers (1991) View citations (1) (1991)

1993

  1. Intransigence in Negotiations
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1993, 37, (4), 692-708 Downloads View citations (6)
  2. Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1993, 12, (2), 1-39 Downloads View citations (11)
    See also Working Paper Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples, Working Papers (1992) (1992)
  3. When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
    Rationality and Society, 1993, 5, (4), 432-454 Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?, Working Papers (1991) View citations (1) (1991)

1992

  1. A Generic Negotiation Game
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1992, 4, (1), 53-66 Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper A Generic Negotiation Game, Working Papers (1991) View citations (1) (1991)
  2. Putting the Other Side “On Notice†Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1992, 36, (3), 395-414 Downloads View citations (3)

1991

  1. Approval Voting in Practice
    Public Choice, 1991, 71, (1-2), 1-17 View citations (14)
    See also Working Paper APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE, Working Papers (1990) (1990)
  2. Comments on Scharpf's “Games Real Actors could Playâ€
    Rationality and Society, 1991, 3, (2), 252-257 Downloads
  3. Final-offer arbitration with a bonus
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1991, 7, (1), 79-92 Downloads View citations (10)
    See also Working Paper Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus, Working Papers (1988) View citations (1) (1988)

1990

  1. Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board
    Interfaces, 1990, 20, (5), 67-80 Downloads View citations (14)
    See also Working Paper CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD, Working Papers (1990) View citations (14) (1990)

1989

  1. The Probability of Nuclear War
    Journal of Peace Research, 1989, 26, (1), 91-99 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper The Probability of Nuclear War, Working Papers (1986) View citations (1) (1986)

1988

  1. The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
    Public Choice, 1988, 59, (2), 121-131 Downloads View citations (20)
    See also Working Paper The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen, Working Papers (1987) View citations (1) (1987)

1987

  1. Optimal Threats
    Operations Research, 1987, 35, (4), 524-536 Downloads
  2. Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis
    American Political Science Review, 1987, 81, (3), 833-850 Downloads View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, Working Papers (1986) View citations (1) (1986)
  3. Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1987, 31, (4), 547-572 Downloads View citations (2)

1986

  1. Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
    Management Science, 1986, 32, (10), 1346-1355 Downloads View citations (28)
    See also Working Paper Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best, Working Papers (1984) (1984)

1985

  1. Comment on The Problem of Strategic Voting under Approval Voting (Vol. 78, December 1984, pp. 952-958)
    American Political Science Review, 1985, 79, (3), 816-818 Downloads View citations (1)
  2. Rejoinder to Niemi
    American Political Science Review, 1985, 79, (3), 819-819 Downloads View citations (3)
  3. Response to Rabow
    Management Science, 1985, 31, (3), 375-376 Downloads

1984

  1. Comment on Wagner (Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 330-346)
    American Political Science Review, 1984, 78, (2), 495-496 Downloads
  2. Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences
    Public Choice, 1984, 44, (3), 397-410 Downloads View citations (19)

1983

  1. Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
    Management Science, 1983, 29, (8), 927-941 Downloads View citations (34)

1982

  1. Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982, 3, (4), 373-388 Downloads View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries, Working Papers (1980) View citations (1) (1980)

1981

  1. Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections
    Public Choice, 1981, 36, (1), 89-114 Downloads View citations (13)
  2. Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting
    Public Choice, 1981, 37, (3), 425-434 Downloads View citations (3)
  3. Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1981, 6, (1), 39-62 Downloads View citations (6)

1980

  1. Letter to the Editor—Authors' Rejoinder
    Operations Research, 1980, 28, (4), 1024-1025 Downloads

1979

  1. Replies
    American Political Science Review, 1979, 73, (2), 552-553 Downloads

1978

  1. Another Solution
    American Political Science Review, 1978, 72, (4), 1365-1366 Downloads
  2. Approval Voting
    American Political Science Review, 1978, 72, (3), 831-847 Downloads View citations (144)
  3. Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
    Operations Research, 1978, 26, (6), 966-991 Downloads View citations (11)
  4. Resource Allocations in the 1976 Campaign
    American Political Science Review, 1978, 72, (4), 1362-1364 Downloads

1977

  1. Deception in 2 × 2 Games
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1977, 2, (2), 171-203 Downloads View citations (3)
  2. The Network Television Game: There May be No Best Schedule
    Interfaces, 1977, 7, (4), 102-109 Downloads
  3. Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case
    Public Choice, 1977, 32, (1), 67-83 Downloads View citations (2)

1975

  1. Comment on “Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College”
    American Political Science Review, 1975, 69, (1), 155-156 Downloads View citations (2)
  2. Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1975, 19, (4), 596-612 Downloads View citations (12)

1974

  1. The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning*
    American Political Science Review, 1974, 68, (1), 113-134 Downloads View citations (29)
  2. When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be
    Public Choice, 1974, 17, (1), 11-25 Downloads View citations (1)

1973

  1. The Paradox of Vote Trading*
    American Political Science Review, 1973, 67, (4), 1235-1247 Downloads View citations (73)

1971

  1. Comment on Mayer's “A Note on ‘An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies’”
    American Political Science Review, 1971, 65, (3), 766-766 Downloads

1970

  1. An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies*
    American Political Science Review, 1970, 64, (2), 449-470 Downloads View citations (7)

1968

  1. Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. By Deutsch Karl W.. (New York: John Wileu & Sons, 1967. Pp. 167. $5.95.)
    American Political Science Review, 1968, 62, (4), 1391-1392 Downloads
  2. Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems
    American Political Science Review, 1968, 62, (2), 461-475 Downloads View citations (6)

1966

  1. Transaction Flows in the International System*
    American Political Science Review, 1966, 60, (4), 880-898 Downloads View citations (7)

Books

2012

  1. Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds, vol 1
    MIT Press Books, The MIT Press View citations (1)
    Also in MIT Press Books, The MIT Press (2011) View citations (21)

2002

  1. Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible, vol 1
    MIT Press Books, The MIT Press View citations (3)

1996

  1. Fair Division
    Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press View citations (26)

Edited books

2009

  1. The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
    Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer View citations (66)

Chapters

2021

  1. Peter Fishburn
    Springer

2014

  1. Satisfaction Approval Voting
    Springer View citations (10)
    See also Working Paper Satisfaction approval voting, University Library of Munich, Germany (2010) Downloads View citations (8) (2010)

2010

  1. Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
    Springer View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting, Springer (2005) Downloads View citations (56) (2005)

2009

  1. How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games
    Springer View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games, University Library of Munich, Germany (2008) Downloads View citations (1) (2008)
  2. Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference
    Springer View citations (28)

2008

  1. The Instability of Power Sharing
    Springer View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper The Instability of Power Sharing, University Library of Munich, Germany (2007) Downloads (2007)

2007

  1. Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures
    A chapter in Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures, 2007 Downloads View citations (3)

2006

  1. How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting
    Springer View citations (20)

2002

  1. Voting procedures
    Chapter 04 in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 1, pp 173-236 Downloads View citations (41)
    Also in Chapter 30 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 1994, vol. 2, pp 1055-1089 (1994) Downloads View citations (5)

    See also Working Paper Voting Procedures, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1998) View citations (1) (1998)
 
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