Details about Steven J. Brams

E-mail:
Homepage:	http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/stevenbrams
Phone:	(212) 998-8510
Postal address:	Dept. of Politics New York University 19 West 4th St., 2nd Fl. New York, NY 10012 U.S.A.
Workplace:	New York University

Access statistics for papers by Steven J. Brams.

Last updated 2025-02-07. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pbr76

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Working Papers

2025

1. Making Tennis Fairer: The Grand Tiebreaker
   Papers, arXiv.org

2024

2. Multi-Tier Tournaments: Matching and Scoring Players
   Papers, arXiv.org View citations (1)

2023

3. Fairer Shootouts in Soccer: The $m-n$ Rule
   Papers, arXiv.org View citations (1)

2021

4. A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
   See also Journal Article A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game, Games, MDPI (2020) View citations (1) (2020)
5. Every Normal-Form Game Has a Pareto-Optimal Nonmyopic Equilibrium
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
   See also Journal Article Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium, Theory and Decision, Springer (2022) View citations (1) (2022)
6. Fairer Chess: A Reversal of Two Opening Moves in Chess Creates Balance Between White and Black
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
   Also in Papers, arXiv.org (2021)
7. Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness Is Impossible
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
   See also Journal Article Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible, SN Operations Research Forum, Springer (2022) (2022)
8. Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: Compatible and Incompatible Properties
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2019

9. Farsightedness in Games: Stabilizing Cooperation in International Conflict
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
10. How Lies Induced Cooperation in "Golden Balls:" A Game-Theoretic Analysis
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2018

11. 3 Persons, 2 Cuts: A Maximin Envy-Free and a Maximally Equitable Cake-Cutting Algorithm
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
12. Catch-Up: A Rule that Makes Service Sports More Competitive
    Papers, arXiv.org View citations (6)
    Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2016) View citations (1)
13. Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
14. The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2022) (2022)

2017

15. Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocation cabinet ministries to political parties in a parlamentary system
    Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University View citations (2)
16. Multi winner Approval Voting: An Apportionment Approach
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach, Public Choice, Springer (2019) View citations (7) (2019)
17. Stabilizing unstable outcomes in prediction games
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (4)

2016

18. Making the Rules of Sports Fairer
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)

2015

19. Catch-Up: A Game in Which the Lead Alternates
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
20. Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2017) View citations (6) (2017)
21. The Paradox of Grading Systems
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (4)
    See also Journal Article The paradox of grading systems, Public Choice, Springer (2015) View citations (4) (2015)

2014

22. An algorithm for the proportional division of indivisible items
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
23. How to divide things fairly
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)
24. Voting power in the Electoral College: The noncompetitive states count, too
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2013

25. Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (8)
26. Two-Sided Matchings: An Algorithm for Ensuring They Are Minimax and Pareto-Optimal
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2012

27. Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)

2011

28. A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
    Also in Working Papers, University of Haifa, Department of Economics
    See also Journal Article A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2015) (2015)
29. Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
    See also Journal Article Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009, Public Choice, Springer (2014) (2014)
30. N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (6)
31. Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
    See also Journal Article Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule, Journal of Theoretical Politics (2012) View citations (4) (2012)
32. Two-person cake-cutting: the optimal number of cuts
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
33. When does approval voting make the "right choices"?
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2010

34. A note on the inefficiency of bargaining over the price of a share
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
35. Divide-and-conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting algorithm
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (2)
36. Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
    Also in Sustainable Development Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) (2009)
    Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2009)
    See also Journal Article Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2013) (2013)
37. Satisfaction approval voting
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (8)
    See also Chapter Satisfaction Approval Voting, Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer (2014) View citations (10) (2014)
38. Two-person pie-cutting: The fairest cuts
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)

2009

39. The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2012) View citations (16) (2012)

2008

40. Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
41. How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
    See also Chapter How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games, Springer Series in Game Theory, Springer (2009) View citations (4) (2009)
42. Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (3)

2007

43. Stabilizing Power Sharing
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
44. The Instability of Power Sharing
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
    See also Chapter The Instability of Power Sharing, Springer Books, Springer (2008) View citations (1) (2008)

2003

45. Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters
    Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations (5)
    See also Journal Article Forming stable coalitions: The process matters, Public Choice, Springer (2005) View citations (12) (2005)

2002

46. Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System
    Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics View citations (5)

2000

47. Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?
    Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ (2000)
    See also Journal Article Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2002) View citations (6) (2002)

1998

48. Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2000) View citations (26) (2000)
49. Fallback Bargaining
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article Fallback Bargaining, Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer (2001) View citations (15) (2001)
50. Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
51. To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
52. Voting Procedures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Chapter Voting procedures, Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier (2002) View citations (41) (2002)

1997

53. Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
54. Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
55. Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
56. The Truel
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (5)
57. Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (31)

1996

58. A Procedure for Divorce Settlements
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
59. Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem, Theory and Decision, Springer (1998) View citations (9) (1998)
60. Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (6)
    See also Journal Article Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair?, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International) (1996) View citations (6) (1996)
61. Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
62. The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
63. The Paradox of Multiple Elections
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article The paradox of multiple elections, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (1998) View citations (56) (1998)

1995

64. A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
65. Fair Division and Politics
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
66. Game Theory and Emotions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (18)
    See also Journal Article GAME THEORY AND EMOTIONS, Rationality and Society (1997) View citations (12) (1997)
67. How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
68. Modeling Free Choice in Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)

1994

69. Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
70. Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
71. The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
72. When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)

1993

73. Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
74. Fair Division by Point Allocation
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
75. Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1992

76. An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (5)
77. Cycles of Conflict
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
78. Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
79. Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (7)
80. Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    See also Journal Article Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International) (1993) View citations (11) (1993)
81. Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
82. Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1991

83. A Generic Negotiation Game
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article A Generic Negotiation Game, Journal of Theoretical Politics (1992) View citations (3) (1992)
84. Arbitration Procedures
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (5)
85. Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
86. Games Theory and Literature
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Game Theory and Literature, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (1994) View citations (17) (1994)
87. Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
88. When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?, Rationality and Society (1993) View citations (5) (1993)
89. Yes-No Voting
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1990

90. APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)
    See also Journal Article Approval Voting in Practice, Public Choice, Springer (1991) View citations (14) (1991)
91. ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
92. CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (14)
    See also Journal Article Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board, Interfaces, INFORMS (1990) View citations (14) (1990)
93. Sequential Arbitration Procedures
    Working Papers, York (Canada) - Department of Economics View citations (2)
    Also in Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1989)
94. THE BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH?
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
95. UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1989

96. COALITION VOTING
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
97. CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1988

98. ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
99. Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus
    Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Final-offer arbitration with a bonus, European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier (1991) View citations (10) (1991)
100. OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
101. Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)

1987

102. Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal?
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
103. Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator?
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
104. National Security Games
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
105. The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
     See also Journal Article The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen, Public Choice, Springer (1988) View citations (20) (1988)

1986

106. Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
107. Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)
108. The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
109. The Probability of Nuclear War
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
     See also Journal Article The Probability of Nuclear War, Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo (1989) View citations (1) (1989)
110. Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
     See also Journal Article Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis, American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press (1987) View citations (6) (1987)
111. Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1985

112. Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
113. Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
114. New Chairman Paradoxes
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
115. Rational De-Escalation
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
116. The Path to Stable Deterrence
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
117. Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)

1984

118. Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
     See also Journal Article Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best, Management Science, INFORMS (1986) View citations (28) (1986)
119. Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
120. Optimal Deterrence
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1983

121. Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
122. The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1982

123. Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
124. Threat Power in Sequential Games
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

1981

125. Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)

1980

126. Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
127. Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
128. Nonmyoptic Equilibria
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (2)
129. Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries
     Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University View citations (1)
     See also Journal Article Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (1982) View citations (6) (1982)

Journal Articles

2022

1. Every normal-form game has a Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium
   Theory and Decision, 2022, 92, (2), 349-362 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper Every Normal-Form Game Has a Pareto-Optimal Nonmyopic Equilibrium, MPRA Paper (2021) (2021)
2. Peter C. Fishburn (1936–2021)
   Theory and Decision, 2022, 93, (1), 1-6
   Also in Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, 57, (1), 1-3 (2021)
3. The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, 58, (2), 283-300
   See also Working Paper The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes, MPRA Paper (2018) View citations (3) (2018)
4. Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness is Impossible
   SN Operations Research Forum, 2022, 3, (2), 1-23
   See also Working Paper Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items when Envy-Freeness Is Impossible, MPRA Paper (2021) (2021)

2020

5. A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game
   Games, 2020, 11, (3), 1-7 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game, MPRA Paper (2021) (2021)
6. Making Partisan Gerrymandering Fair: One Old and Two New Methods
   Social Science Quarterly, 2020, 101, (1), 68-72

2019

7. Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach
   Public Choice, 2019, 178, (1), 67-93 View citations (7)
   See also Working Paper Multi winner Approval Voting: An Apportionment Approach, MPRA Paper (2017) View citations (1) (2017)

2017

8. Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items
   Group Decision and Negotiation, 2017, 26, (1), 115-131 View citations (6)
   See also Working Paper Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items, MPRA Paper (2015) View citations (1) (2015)
9. Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states
   Public Choice, 2017, 170, (1), 99-113 View citations (1)

2015

10. A Simple Bargaining Mechanism that Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 2015, 24, (3), 401-413
    See also Working Paper A Simple Bargaining Mechanism That Elicits Truthful Reservation Prices, MPRA Paper (2011) (2011)
11. The paradox of grading systems
    Public Choice, 2015, 165, (3), 193-210 View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper The Paradox of Grading Systems, MPRA Paper (2015) View citations (4) (2015)

2014

12. Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009
    Public Choice, 2014, 158, (3), 525-539
    See also Working Paper Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009, MPRA Paper (2011) (2011)

2013

13. Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 41, (1), 1-18
    See also Working Paper Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation, MPRA Paper (2010) View citations (1) (2010)

2012

14. Narrowing the field in elections: The Next-Two rule
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2012, 24, (4), 507-525 View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper Narrowing the field in elections: the next-two rule, MPRA Paper (2011) (2011)
15. The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, 39, (2), 615-631 View citations (16)
    See also Working Paper The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items, MPRA Paper (2009) View citations (2) (2009)

2010

16. A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2010, 60, (3), 191-195 View citations (1)

2008

17. Proportional pie-cutting
    International Journal of Game Theory, 2008, 36, (3), 353-367 View citations (12)

2007

18. A minimax procedure for electing committees
    Public Choice, 2007, 132, (3), 401-420 View citations (47)
19. Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings
    Public Choice, 2007, 131, (3), 465-468 View citations (3)

2006

20. Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election
    Public Choice, 2006, 128, (3), 361-366 View citations (5)
21. The normative turn in public choice
    Public Choice, 2006, 127, (3), 245-250 View citations (4)

2005

22. Efficient Fair Division
    Rationality and Society, 2005, 17, (4), 387-421 View citations (21)
23. Forming stable coalitions: The process matters
    Public Choice, 2005, 125, (1), 67-94 View citations (12)
    See also Working Paper Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters, Working Papers (2003) View citations (5) (2003)
24. Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25, (2), 457-474 View citations (57)
    See also Chapter Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting, Studies in Choice and Welfare, 2010, 19-37 (2010) View citations (4) (2010)

2004

25. Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2004, 48, (3), 251-269 View citations (20)
26. Dividing the Indivisible
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2004, 16, (2), 143-173 View citations (6)

2003

27. FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS
    Theory and Decision, 2003, 55, (2), 147-180 View citations (17)

2002

28. Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2002, 40, (2), 185-202 View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?, Cahiers de recherche (2000) (2000)
29. Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2002, 14, (3), 359-383 View citations (25)

2001

30. A nail-biting election
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2001, 18, (3), 409-414 View citations (7)
31. Competitive Fair Division
    Journal of Political Economy, 2001, 109, (2), 418-443 View citations (36)
32. Fallback Bargaining
    Group Decision and Negotiation, 2001, 10, (4), 287-316 View citations (15)
    See also Working Paper Fallback Bargaining, Working Papers (1998) View citations (2) (1998)
33. Response to Randall Stone
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2001, 45, (2), 245-254 View citations (3)

2000

34. Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (2), 247-267 View citations (26)
    See also Working Paper Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity, Working Papers (1998) (1998)
35. Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations
    Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2000, 6, (2), 11 View citations (3)

1999

36. AGREEMENT THROUGH THREATS: THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE
    International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 1999, 01, (03n04), 251-265
37. CATCH-22 AND KING-OF-THE-MOUNTAIN GAMES
    Rationality and Society, 1999, 11, (2), 139-167 View citations (5)

1998

38. Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem
    Theory and Decision, 1998, 45, (3), 263-289 View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem, Working Papers (1996) (1996)
39. Proportional Representation
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1998, 10, (2), 147-178 View citations (4)
40. The paradox of multiple elections
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, 15, (2), 211-236 View citations (56)
    See also Working Paper The Paradox of Multiple Elections, Working Papers (1996) (1996)

1997

41. GAME THEORY AND EMOTIONS
    Rationality and Society, 1997, 9, (1), 91-124 View citations (12)
    See also Working Paper Game Theory and Emotions, Working Papers (1995) View citations (18) (1995)

1996

42. Camp David: Was The Agreement Fair?
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1996, 15, (1), 99-112 View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair?, Working Papers (1996) View citations (6) (1996)
43. Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
    Social Choice and Welfare, 1996, 13, (4), 397-417 View citations (14)

1995

44. Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence. Edited by Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt. Aldershot, UK: Elgar, 1994. 213p. $74.95
    American Political Science Review, 1995, 89, (2), 527-528
45. When is Size a Liability?
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995, 7, (3), 301-316 View citations (10)

1994

46. Game Theory and Literature
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6, (1), 32-54 View citations (17)
    See also Working Paper Games Theory and Literature, Working Papers (1991) View citations (1) (1991)

1993

47. Intransigence in Negotiations
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1993, 37, (4), 692-708 View citations (6)
48. Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1993, 12, (2), 1-39 View citations (11)
    See also Working Paper Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples, Working Papers (1992) (1992)
49. When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?
    Rationality and Society, 1993, 5, (4), 432-454 View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?, Working Papers (1991) View citations (1) (1991)

1992

50. A Generic Negotiation Game
    Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1992, 4, (1), 53-66 View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper A Generic Negotiation Game, Working Papers (1991) View citations (1) (1991)
51. Putting the Other Side “On Notice†Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1992, 36, (3), 395-414 View citations (3)

1991

52. Approval Voting in Practice
    Public Choice, 1991, 71, (1-2), 1-17 View citations (14)
    See also Working Paper APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE, Working Papers (1990) (1990)
53. Comments on Scharpf's “Games Real Actors could Playâ€
    Rationality and Society, 1991, 3, (2), 252-257
54. Final-offer arbitration with a bonus
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1991, 7, (1), 79-92 View citations (10)
    See also Working Paper Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus, Working Papers (1988) View citations (1) (1988)

1990

55. Constrained Approval Voting: A Voting System to Elect a Governing Board
    Interfaces, 1990, 20, (5), 67-80 View citations (14)
    See also Working Paper CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD, Working Papers (1990) View citations (14) (1990)

1989

56. The Probability of Nuclear War
    Journal of Peace Research, 1989, 26, (1), 91-99 View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper The Probability of Nuclear War, Working Papers (1986) View citations (1) (1986)

1988

57. The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen
    Public Choice, 1988, 59, (2), 121-131 View citations (20)
    See also Working Paper The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen, Working Papers (1987) View citations (1) (1987)

1987

58. Optimal Threats
    Operations Research, 1987, 35, (4), 524-536
59. Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-theoretic Analysis
    American Political Science Review, 1987, 81, (3), 833-850 View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, Working Papers (1986) View citations (1) (1986)
60. Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1987, 31, (4), 547-572 View citations (2)

1986

61. Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
    Management Science, 1986, 32, (10), 1346-1355 View citations (28)
    See also Working Paper Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best, Working Papers (1984) (1984)

1985

62. Comment on The Problem of Strategic Voting under Approval Voting (Vol. 78, December 1984, pp. 952-958)
    American Political Science Review, 1985, 79, (3), 816-818 View citations (1)
63. Rejoinder to Niemi
    American Political Science Review, 1985, 79, (3), 819-819 View citations (3)
64. Response to Rabow
    Management Science, 1985, 31, (3), 375-376

1984

65. Comment on Wagner (Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 330-346)
    American Political Science Review, 1984, 78, (2), 495-496
66. Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences
    Public Choice, 1984, 44, (3), 397-410 View citations (20)

1983

67. Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
    Management Science, 1983, 29, (8), 927-941 View citations (34)

1982

68. Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982, 3, (4), 373-388 View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries, Working Papers (1980) View citations (1) (1980)

1981

69. Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections
    Public Choice, 1981, 36, (1), 89-114 View citations (13)
70. Efficacy, power and equity under approval voting
    Public Choice, 1981, 37, (3), 425-434 View citations (3)
71. Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2×2 Games
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1981, 6, (1), 39-62 View citations (6)

1980

72. Letter to the Editor—Authors' Rejoinder
    Operations Research, 1980, 28, (4), 1024-1025

1979

73. Replies
    American Political Science Review, 1979, 73, (2), 552-553

1978

74. Another Solution
    American Political Science Review, 1978, 72, (4), 1365-1366
75. Approval Voting
    American Political Science Review, 1978, 72, (3), 831-847 View citations (144)
76. Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
    Operations Research, 1978, 26, (6), 966-991 View citations (11)
77. Resource Allocations in the 1976 Campaign
    American Political Science Review, 1978, 72, (4), 1362-1364

1977

78. Deception in 2 × 2 Games
    Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1977, 2, (2), 171-203 View citations (3)
79. The Network Television Game: There May be No Best Schedule
    Interfaces, 1977, 7, (4), 102-109
80. Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case
    Public Choice, 1977, 32, (1), 67-83 View citations (2)

1975

81. Comment on “Campaign Resource Allocations under the Electoral College”
    American Political Science Review, 1975, 69, (1), 155-156 View citations (2)
82. Newcomb's Problem and Prisoners' Dilemma
    Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1975, 19, (4), 596-612 View citations (12)

1974

83. The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning*
    American Political Science Review, 1974, 68, (1), 113-134 View citations (29)
84. When to join a coalition, and with how many others, depends on what you expect the outcome to be
    Public Choice, 1974, 17, (1), 11-25 View citations (1)

1973

85. The Paradox of Vote Trading*
    American Political Science Review, 1973, 67, (4), 1235-1247 View citations (73)

1971

86. Comment on Mayer's “A Note on ‘An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies’”
    American Political Science Review, 1971, 65, (3), 766-766

1970

87. An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies*
    American Political Science Review, 1970, 64, (2), 449-470 View citations (7)

1968

88. Arms Control and the Atlantic Alliance: Europe Faces Coming Policy Decisions. By Deutsch Karl W.. (New York: John Wileu & Sons, 1967. Pp. 167. $5.95.)
    American Political Science Review, 1968, 62, (4), 1391-1392
89. Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems
    American Political Science Review, 1968, 62, (2), 461-475 View citations (6)

1966

90. Transaction Flows in the International System*
    American Political Science Review, 1966, 60, (4), 880-898 View citations (7)

Books

2012

1. Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds, vol 1
   MIT Press Books, The MIT Press View citations (1)
   Also in MIT Press Books, The MIT Press (2011) View citations (21)

2002

2. Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible, vol 1
   MIT Press Books, The MIT Press View citations (3)

1996

3. Fair Division
   Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press View citations (26)

Edited books

2009

1. The Mathematics of Preference, Choice and Order
   Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer View citations (66)

Chapters

2021

1. Peter Fishburn
   Springer

2014

2. Satisfaction Approval Voting
   Springer View citations (10)
   See also Working Paper Satisfaction approval voting, University Library of Munich, Germany (2010) View citations (8) (2010)

2010

3. Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting
   Springer View citations (4)
   See also Journal Article Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting, Springer (2005) View citations (57) (2005)

2009

4. How Democracy Resolves Conflict in Difficult Games
   Springer View citations (4)
   See also Working Paper How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games, University Library of Munich, Germany (2008) View citations (1) (2008)
5. Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference
   Springer View citations (29)

2008

6. The Instability of Power Sharing
   Springer View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper The Instability of Power Sharing, University Library of Munich, Germany (2007) (2007)

2007

7. Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures
   A chapter in Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures, 2007 View citations (3)

2006

8. How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting
   Springer View citations (20)

2002

9. Voting procedures
   Chapter 04 in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 1, pp 173-236 View citations (41)
   Also in Chapter 30 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 1994, vol. 2, pp 1055-1089 (1994) View citations (5)
   See also Working Paper Voting Procedures, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University (1998) View citations (1) (1998)