The Instability of Power Sharing

Steven Brams () and D. Marc Kilgour
Additional contact information
D. Marc Kilgour: Wilfrid Laurier University

Chapter 12. in Power, Freedom, and Voting, 2008, pp 227-243 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract When two factions clash within a committee, a company, or a country, a natural question to ask is: Why don’t they share power or responsibilities and try to reach a compromise that, while leaving neither faction in control, at least leaves neither too aggrieved.

Keywords: Discount Factor; Damage Factor; Trigger Strategy; Sustainable Peace; Expected Share (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Instability of Power Sharing (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-73382-9_12

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540733829

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73382-9_12

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().