Deception in 2 × 2 Games

Steven Brams ()

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1977, vol. 2, issue 2, 171-203

Abstract: Deception, which involves the conscious misrepresentation by Deceiver of his preferences to Deceived in a game of incomplete information, is analyzed in 2 × 2 games in which the preferences of players are strictly ordered. The 78 distinct 2 × 2 games are divided into three mutually exclusive classes: 1. Deception-proof (27 percent): Not susceptible to deception by either player. 2. Deception-stable (51 percent): While susceptible to deception by at least one player, neither player can ensure himself of a better outcome through deception. 3. Deception-vulnerable (tacit) (22 percent): At least one player can ensure himself of a better outcome only through deception. In addition, a fourth class of games (35 percent of total). which cuts across classes 2 and 3 above, are shown to be vulnerable to Deceiver who “reveals†himself in the play of a game. Several theorems that characterize and interrelate the four classes and eleven finer categories of 2 × 2 games are proved. The theory is applied to the analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, in which it is suggested that the United States might, paradoxically, have benefited from being deceived by the Soviet Union.

Date: 1977
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/073889427700200201 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:2:y:1977:i:2:p:171-203

DOI: 10.1177/073889427700200201

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Conflict Management and Peace Science from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().