Intransigence in Negotiations

Steven Brams () and Ann E. Doherty
Additional contact information
Ann E. Doherty: Newton Centre, MA

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1993, vol. 37, issue 4, 692-708

Abstract: Three-party negotiations are analyzed in which the players are able not only to rank alternatives but also have a preference for impasse. In a dynamic model, players progressively invoke fallback positions to try to prevent inferior outcomes from being implemented in a game of incomplete information. A player's intransigence, or unwillingness to retreat to fallback positions, generally works to his or her advantage. Greater size—or, equivalently, an enhanced ability to effect preferred outcomes—also helps, but intransigence is a potent force by itself. In fact, intransigence may prevail despite the fact that there is a so-called Condorcet alternative that could defeat it and all other alternatives. The analysis illuminates the rational basis of disagreement and why it develops in the manner it does. Extensions of the dynamic model are discussed, including making the preferences of the players for impasse endogenous.

Date: 1993
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002793037004006 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:37:y:1993:i:4:p:692-708

DOI: 10.1177/0022002793037004006

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Conflict Resolution from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().