Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem

D.M. Kilgour and Steven Brams ()

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: A cornerstone of game theory is backward induction, whereby players reason backward from the end of a game in extensive form to the beginning in order to determine what choices are rational at each stage of play. Truels, or three-person duels, are used to illustrate how the outcome can depend on (1) the evenness/oddness of the number of rounds (the parity problem) and (2) uncertainty about the endpoint of the game (the uncertainty problem).

Keywords: UNCERTAINTY; GAME THEORY; GAMES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C73 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1996
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Journal Article: Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem (1998)
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