Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting

Steven Brams () and Peter C. Fishburn

Chapter Chapter 3 in Handbook on Approval Voting, 2010, pp 19-37 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Approval voting (AV) is a voting procedure in which voters can vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections (i.e., those with more than two candidates). Each candidate approved of receives one vote, and the candidate with the most votes wins.

Keywords: Condorcet Winner; Approval Vote; Plurality Vote; Lower Common Denominator; Multiple Voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Journal Article: Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting (2005)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_3

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