How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting

D. Marc Kilgour, Steven Brams () and Remzi Sanver
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D. Marc Kilgour: Wilfrid Laurier University

A chapter in Mathematics and Democracy, 2006, pp 83-95 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Approval balloting is applied to the problem of electing a representative committee. We demonstrate several procedures for determining a committee based on approval ballots, paying particular attention to weighting methods that can reduce the influence of voters with extreme views. We show that a general class of voting systems based on approval ballots can be implemented through analysis of appropriate tables. A by-product of this procedure is a clarification of the complexity of these systems.

Keywords: Approval balloting; committee election; complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-540-35605-9_6

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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-35605-3_6

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