To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises
Steven Brams ()
Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
IN his classic novel, "Catch-22" (1961), Joseph Heller describes a thoroughly frustrating situation faced by a combat pilot in World War II. This is generalized to a "generic" 2x2 strict ordinal game, in which whatever strategy the column player chooses, the best response of the row player is to inflict on the column player a worst or next-worst outcome, and possibly vice-versa. The 12 specific games subsumed by the generic game are called catch-22 games.
Keywords: GAMES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
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