Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation

Steven Brams () and D. Marc Kilgour

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The first player(s) acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumption--particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness--and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The fallback procedure may be used (i) empirically to identify kingmakers and leaders or (ii) normatively to select them. We illustrate and test the model by applying it to coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court, 2005-2009, which shows the build-up over stages of a conservative coalition that prevailed in nearly half of the 5-4 decisions.

Keywords: coalition formation; fallback procedure; kingmakers; leaders; US Supreme Court (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D72 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation (2013)
Working Paper: Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation (2009)
Working Paper: Kingmakers and Leaders in Coalition Formation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:22710

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