Efficient Fair Division

Steven Brams () and Daniel L. King
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Daniel L. King: Sarah Lawrence College, dking@mail.slc.edu

Rationality and Society, 2005, vol. 17, issue 4, 387-421

Abstract: Two or more players rank a set of indivisible items from best to worst. An efficient allocation of items is characterized, which may satisfy such properties as maximin, Borda maximin, and envy-avoidance. Whereas the two maximin properties are in conflict with envy-avoidance, there is always an efficient allocation that does not ensure envy, but it may not be maximin or Borda maximin. Computer calculations show that maximin allocations lead to envy quite often, but Borda maximin allocations do so only rarely. Implications of the theoretical findings for real-world fair-division problems are discussed.

Keywords: Borda count; envy-freeness; fair division; maximin; Pareto-optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:17:y:2005:i:4:p:387-421

DOI: 10.1177/1043463105058317

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