Fallback Bargaining

Steven Brams () and D.M. Kilgour

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: Fallback bargaining is a bargaining procedure under which bargainers begin by indicating their preference rankings over all alternatives. They then fall back, in lockstep, to less and less preferred alternatives - starting with first choices, then adding second choices, and so on - until an alternative is found on which all bargainers agree. This common agreement, which becomes the outcome of the procedure, may be different if a decision rule other than unanimity is used.

Keywords: BARGAINING; SOCIAL CHOICE; NASH EQUILIBRIUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D58 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Fallback Bargaining (2001)
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