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Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states

Steven Brams () and D. Marc Kilgour ()
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D. Marc Kilgour: Wilfrid Laurier University

Public Choice, 2017, vol. 170, issue 1, No 5, 99-113

Abstract: Abstract In US presidential elections, voters in noncompetitive states seem not to count—and have zero power, according to standard measures of voting power—because they cannot influence the outcome in their states. But the electoral votes of these states are essential to a candidate’s victory, so they do count, but in a different way. We propose a simple model that enables us to measure the setup power of voters in noncompetitive states by modeling how these states structure the contest in the competitive states, as illustrated by the 2012, 2008, 2004, and 2000 presidential elections. We define three measures of setup power—winningness, vulnerability, and fragility—and show how they pinpoint the advantages of the candidate who leads in electoral votes of noncompetitive states. In fact, this candidate won in all four elections.

Keywords: Presidential elections; Electoral College; Measure of voting power; Setup power of noncompetitive states (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0386-8

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