Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations

Steven Brams ()

Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2000, vol. 6, issue 2, 11

Abstract: In the last twenty years or so years, there has been a surge of interest in modeling both national security and international political economy issues using the tools of game theory. In this brief note, I will not cite this now extensive literature but instead (1) outline four major theoretical problems that have bedeviled various attempts at modeling international relations (IR) phenomena and processes and (2) propose an alternative approach, grounded in game theory, that I and others have found attractive in (i) capturing the thinking of decision makers and (ii) realistically modeling their strategic choices in a parsimonious but historically informed way.

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.2202/1554-8597.1032

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