Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership
Stergios Athanassoglou,
Steven Brams () and
Jay Sethuraman
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Stergios Athanasoglou
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
We study the problem of dissolving an equal-entitlement partnership when the objective is to minimize maximum regret. We initially focus on the family of linear-pricing mechanisms and derive regret-optimizing strategies. We also demonstrate that there exist linear-pricing mechanisms satisfying ex-post efficiency. Next, we analyze a binary-search mechanism which is ex-post individually rational. We discuss connections with the standard Bayesian-Nash framework for both linear and binary-search mechanisms. On a more general level, we show that if entitlements are unequal, ex-post efficiency and ex-post individual rationality impose significant restrictions on permissible mechanisms. In particular, they rule out both linear and binary-search mechanisms.
Keywords: Partnership dissolution; minimax regret; fair division; allocative efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:12776
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