Alternative Mechanisms of Allocating Computer Resources Under Queueing Delays

Seungjin Whang
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Seungjin Whang: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

Information Systems Research, 1990, vol. 1, issue 1, 71-88

Abstract: A theoretical framework is developed in which alternative mechanisms of allocating congestion-prone computer resources are studied and compared. Two—discrete and continuum—models of economies are presented to depict a small and a large economy respectively. Alternative allocation mechanisms are discussed in these two models: (1) the private bargaining approach, (2) allocations attainable through Nash equilibria and (3) the Clarke-Groves tax mechanism in the discrete economy model, and (4) Mendelson's (1985) job-by-job pricing and (5) the exchange-market-based allocation in the continuum economy model. We find equivalence among the bribes and prices associated with these mechanisms. The theory is related to practical implications pertaining to the design of computer chargeback systems and the role of the system manager.

Keywords: control of computer resources; queueing delays; allocation methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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