Induction over Strategic Agents

Fidan Boylu (), Haldun Aytug () and Gary J. Koehler ()
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Fidan Boylu: Department of Operations and Information Management, School of Business, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06269
Haldun Aytug: Information Systems and Operations Management Department, The Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611
Gary J. Koehler: Information Systems and Operations Management Department, The Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611

Information Systems Research, 2010, vol. 21, issue 1, 170-189

Abstract: We study the problem where a decision maker needs to discover a classification rule to classify intelligent, self-interested agents. Agents may engage in strategic behavior to alter their characteristics for a favorable classification. We show how the decision maker can induce a classification rule that anticipates such behavior while still satisfying an important risk minimization principle.

Keywords: discriminant analysis; principal-agent; strategic gaming; generalization; adversarial learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:orisre:v:21:y:2010:i:1:p:170-189

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