Do Incentive Hierarchies Induce User Effort? Evidence from an Online Knowledge Exchange

Paulo B. Goes (), Chenhui Guo () and Mingfeng Lin ()
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Paulo B. Goes: Dean and Halle Chair in Leadership, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721
Chenhui Guo: Department of Management Information Systems, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721
Mingfeng Lin: Department of Management Information Systems, Eller College of Management, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721

Information Systems Research, 2016, vol. 27, issue 3, 497-516

Abstract: To motivate user contributions, user-generated content sites routinely deploy incentive hierarchies, where users achieve increasingly higher statuses in the community after achieving increasingly more difficult goals. Yet the existing empirical literature remains largely unclear whether such hierarchies are indeed effective in inducing user contributions. We gather data from a large online crowd-based knowledge exchange to answer this question, and draw on goal setting and status hierarchy theories to study users’ contributions before and after they reach consecutive ranks on a vertical incentive hierarchy. We find evidence that even though these glory-based incentives may motivate users to contribute more before the goals are reached, user contribution levels drop significantly after that. The positive effect on user contribution appears only temporary. Moreover, such impacts are increasingly smaller for higher ranks. Our results highlight some unintended and heretofore undocumented effects of incentive hierarchies, and have important implications for business models that rely on user contributions, such as knowledge exchange and crowdsourcing, as well as the broader phenomenon of gamification in other contexts.

Keywords: online knowledge exchange; motivation; status; incentive hierarchy; goals; effort; user-generated content (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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