Information Feedback, Targeting, and Coordination: An Experimental Study

Matthew J. Hashim (), Karthik N. Kannan () and Sandra Maximiano ()
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Matthew J. Hashim: University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721
Karthik N. Kannan: Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907
Sandra Maximiano: Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907

Information Systems Research, 2017, vol. 28, issue 2, 289-308

Abstract: There are many contexts in which an “everybody else is doing it” attitude is relevant. We evaluate the impact of this attitude in a multithreshold public goods game. We use a lab experiment to study the role of providing information about contribution behavior to targeted subsets of individuals, and its effect on coordination. Treatments include one in which no information is provided and three other treatments, i.e., where information is provided to a random sample of subjects; to those whose contributions are below the average of their group, and to those whose contributions are above the average of their group. We find that the random provision of information is no different than not providing information. More important, average contributions improve with targeted treatments. Coordination waste is also lower with targeted treatments. The insights from this research are more broadly relevant in the contexts of piracy, open innovation, and crowdfunding.

Keywords: economics of IS; experimental economics; public good; piracy; crowdfunding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:orisre:v:28:y:2017:i:2:p:289-308

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