Does It Pay to Shroud In-App Purchase Prices?

Jeffrey D. Shulman () and Xianjun Geng ()
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Jeffrey D. Shulman: Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195
Xianjun Geng: A. B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana 70118

Information Systems Research, 2019, vol. 30, issue 3, 856-871

Abstract: Application (app) developers commonly sell their apps at relatively low prices and subsequently earn substantial revenue from in-app purchases. Although some consumers may do their research about in-app prices before deciding whether to buy the app, others only discover the in-app prices later in the purchase process. This paper presents an analytical model to examine the profit and welfare implications of hidden prices of the in-app purchases. This paper has three main contributions. First, it finds a profit-improvement effect of hidden prices under circumstances for which prior literature finds profit irrelevance. In this regard, the model identifies a new mechanism driving the profit-improvement result. Second, it finds when app developers can be made better off by platforms disclosing in-app purchase prices. Third, it shows how platform decisions intended to improve pricing transparency may actually diminish consumer welfare. We also consider a model variation whereby app developers can shroud in-app prices. The findings have implications for app developers considering hidden in-app purchases, as well as platforms such as Google, Apple, and Amazon, which can restrict this practice.

Keywords: game theory; in-app purchase; shrouded prices; pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:orisre:v:30:y:2019:i:3:p:856-871

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