Mr. Right or Mr. Best: The Role of Information Under Preference Mismatch in Online Dating

Hongchuan Shen (), Chu (Ivy) Dang () and Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang ()
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Hongchuan Shen: Faculty of Business Administration, University of Macau, Macau, China
Chu (Ivy) Dang: Faculty of Business and Economics, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang: Department of Decision Sciences and Managerial Economics, Business School, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; Department of Management Science and Engineering, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Information Systems Research, 2024, vol. 35, issue 4, 2013-2029

Abstract: This paper examines the role of information in two-sided matching markets where preference mismatch is present. Two-sided markets are characterized by different preferences of the parties involved, and a match occurs when both sides show a preference for each other. In practice, however, there is often a preference mismatch. In this study, we use a large data set from an online dating website to provide empirical evidence for preference mismatch in the field. We also develop empirical models to investigate the impact of information under preference mismatch by analyzing variations in the amount of available information. Specifically, we compare partial and complete information contained in the users’ short and long profiles, respectively. We find that more information about the other side does not necessarily improve the likelihood of a match. In fact, the side making the proposal has a better chance of matching if the decision is based on the information contained in the short profile rather than the long profile. This suggests that users are better off seeing partial rather than complete information about the candidates, a phenomenon we refer to as the “less information is more” effect. Our empirical analysis shows that this effect is driven by the mismatched preferences of the two sides. These results imply that there is an optimal amount of information that one side should possess about the other before making a proposal. Our study highlights the importance of optimal information design strategies to determine the appropriate amount of information that should be provided to each side. Our findings also offer managerial implications regarding information provision strategies for online platforms in general.

Keywords: preference mismatch; matching platforms; two-sided markets; online dating; information disclosure; information design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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