Research Note—The Effects of Costs and Competition on Slotting Allowances

Dmitri Kuksov () and Amit Pazgal ()
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Dmitri Kuksov: Washington University in St. Louis, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis, Missouri 63130-4899
Amit Pazgal: Rice University, 6100 Main Street, Houston, Texas 77005

Marketing Science, 2007, vol. 26, issue 2, 259-267

Abstract: We consider the optimal two-part tariff contract between a manufacturer and a retailer. We show that retail competition (in the presence of either fixed costs or bargaining power) may lead to slotting allowances in an optimal contract, even with a monopoly manufacturer and no information asymmetry. On the other hand, slotting allowances do not arise with a monopoly retailer and no information asymmetry, whether the manufacturer is a monopoly or not. We also show that more intense retail competition, higher retail bargaining power, larger retailer fixed costs, lower marginal costs of retailing, as well as larger relative retailer size (whether coming from a location or operating advantage), have a positive impact on the incidence and the magnitude of slotting allowances. The opposing effects of the fixed and marginal operating costs on slotting allowances, as well as the impact of competition and bargaining power on profits, underscore the importance of careful definitions of these variables in empirical research.

Keywords: slotting allowances; bargaining power; distribution channels; channel coordination; competition; pricing; retailing; wholesaling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:26:y:2007:i:2:p:259-267

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