Implications of Channel Structure for Leasing or Selling Durable Goods

Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran () and Stephen M. Gilbert ()
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Sreekumar R. Bhaskaran: Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas 75275
Stephen M. Gilbert: McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712

Marketing Science, 2009, vol. 28, issue 5, 918-934

Abstract: In spite of the fact that many durable products are sold through dealers, the literature has largely ignored the issue of how product durability affects the interactions between a manufacturer and her dealers. We seek to fill this gap by considering a durable goods manufacturer that uses independent dealers to get her product to consumers. In contrast to much of the literature, we specifically consider the possibility that if the manufacturer sells her product, then the dealers can either sell or lease it to the final consumer. One of our more interesting findings is that, when the level of competition among dealers is high, the manufacturer prefers to use a lease-brokering arrangement in which the dealers earn a margin for brokering leases between the manufacturer and end consumers, instead of selling her product to the dealers. This complements existing results that show that when suppliers of durable goods interact directly with consumers, selling is the dominant strategy for high levels of competitive intensity.

Keywords: channel structure; durability; time inconsistency; double marginalization; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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