Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games

James D. Dana () and Kevin R. Williams ()
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James D. Dana: Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts 02115
Kevin R. Williams: Yale School of Management, New Haven, Connecticut 06520; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Marketing Science, 2022, vol. 41, issue 5, 966-981

Abstract: This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show that the existence of multiple sales opportunities creates strong competitive forces that prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then show that intertemporal price discrimination is possible but only when firms adopt inventory controls (sales limit restrictions) and demand becomes more inelastic over time. Therefore, we show that in addition to being useful to manage demand uncertainty, inventory controls are also a tool to soften price competition. We discuss model extensions, including product differentiation, aggregate demand uncertainty, and longer sales horizons.

Keywords: competitive analysis; game theory; pricing; segmentation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:41:y:2022:i:5:p:966-981

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