Slotting Fees and Price Discrimination in Retail Channels

Sreya Kolay () and Greg Shaffer ()
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Sreya Kolay: School of Business, University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, New York 12222
Greg Shaffer: Simon Business School, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York 14627

Marketing Science, 2022, vol. 41, issue 6, 1145-1162

Abstract: We consider a manufacturer’s optimal contract design in the presence of asymmetric retailers. We first solve for the case in which the manufacturer can overtly discriminate between its retailers by offering each a different two-part tariff contract. We then compare it to the case in which overt discrimination is not feasible and the manufacturer must instead induce self-selection. We find that whereas there is no role for slotting fees when overt discrimination is possible, slotting fees can arise as part of the equilibrium menu of contracts offered to both retailers in the absence of such discrimination. It is found that the large retailer always prefers the contract with the lower wholesale price, even if it means not accepting a slotting fee, whereas the small retailer always accepts the largest slotting fee offered, even though it means taking on the contract with the higher wholesale price. Our results also suggest that the wholesale prices (and hence retail prices) of both retailers will be uniformly higher when overt discrimination is infeasible.

Keywords: analytical models; channel relationships; competitive analysis; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:41:y:2022:i:6:p:1145-1162

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