Platform Manipulation in Online Retail Marketplace with Sponsored Advertising

Fei Long () and Yunchuan Liu ()
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Fei Long: Kenan–Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599
Yunchuan Liu: Department of Business Administration, Gies College of Business, University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign, Champaign, Illinois 61820

Marketing Science, 2024, vol. 43, issue 2, 317-345

Abstract: In this paper, we study an online retail marketplace’s incentive to manipulate sellers’ product attractiveness to consumers (e.g., through fake sales, fake reviews, or dishonest endorsement), as well as sellers’ placement ranking. We design a model of an online retail marketplace with a platform that manipulates sellers’ product attractiveness and sellers’ organic ranking order, and the sellers decide product prices and bid for sponsored advertising space on the platform. We find that the platform may manipulate an inferior seller’s product to appear more attractive to intensify sellers’ competition to bid for advertising and also manipulate a superior seller’s organic placement to either compensate or penalize the superior seller. We show that public policies, such as banning fake sales and fake reviews only by third-party sellers, may not necessarily eradicate manipulation on the platform if they ignore the platform’s incentive for manipulation in the first place.

Keywords: platform manipulation; fake sales; fake reviews; endorsement; sponsored advertising; auction; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:43:y:2024:i:2:p:317-345

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