The Power of a Coalition

Michael Maschler
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Michael Maschler: Princeton University and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Management Science, 1963, vol. 10, issue 1, 8-29

Abstract: If certain information is given about the "psychology" of the players who participate in an n-person cooperative game, concerning their bargaining abilities, their moral codes, their roles in the various coalitions and their a priori expectations, then it is possible to define a measure for the power of each coalition which, perhaps, is a better description of the game than the usual characteristic function. The required information, called the standard of fairness of the players is a Thrall partition function which satisfies certain requirements. Its determination is discussed both from an experimental and from a theoretical point of view. In terms of the power, every game becomes a constant-sum game. Applications to the von Neumann and Morgenstern solutions and to the bargaining set are discussed.

Date: 1963
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