Solvable Nuclear War Models

Norman C. Dalkey
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Norman C. Dalkey: The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Management Science, 1965, vol. 11, issue 9, 783-791

Abstract: This paper deals with an aggregated, two-sided war game, one of several designed to study the use of abstract models for strategic planning. A payoff function for the war game is defined making use of an assumption of increasing concern as a critical level of damage is approached. A very simple, one-weapon version of the central nuclear war game has an analytic solution, indicating the existence of a stable (equilibrium) point in pure strategies if each side has a nonnegligible counterforce capability.

Date: 1965
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