Competitive Organizational Structures in Coupled Markets

Melvin F. Shakun
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Melvin F. Shakun: New York University

Management Science, 1968, vol. 14, issue 12, B663-B673

Abstract: The effect of different company organizational structures (as centralized and decentralized) on competition in coupled markets is studied using a game theory approach. By coupling it is meant that management actions taken in the market for one product have an effect on the market for another. A specific example is where advertising dollars spent in generating sales for one product have an influence on the sales of another product. In some cases competition between companies in coupled markets takes the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma and may be discussed in terms of recent research findings on this game. Various other aspects of research on competitive organizational structures in coupled markets are discussed.

Date: 1968
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