Communications to the Editor--Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information

Robert Wilson ()

Management Science, 1969, vol. 15, issue 7, 446-452

Abstract: This paper analyses competitive bidding via sealed tenders for the case in which the bidders have different sources and amounts of information available about the value of the prize. The equilibrium pure strategies are characterized and computational methods are derived. A simple example is solved completely.

Date: 1969
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:15:y:1969:i:7:p:446-452

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