The Geometry of Solution Concepts for N-Person Cooperative Games

Richard Spinetto
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Richard Spinetto: University of Colorado

Management Science, 1974, vol. 20, issue 9, 1292-1299

Abstract: The closed convex polyhedron consisting of all 0-1 normal n-person games with nonempty core is characterized by naming its extreme points. This characterization establishes a geometric setting, in the game space itself, for such solution concepts as the core and the nucleolus. This geometric setting also suggests new solution concepts. A similar geometric setting is also established for the Shapley value, and core and nucleolus solution concepts can be defined in this geometric setting.

Date: 1974
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