Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information

Joseph T. Howson, Jr. and Robert Rosenthal
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Joseph T. Howson, Jr.: School of Management, Boston College

Management Science, 1974, vol. 21, issue 3, 313-315

Abstract: The equivalence of Bayesian equilibria of two-person games with incomplete information and Nash equilibria of certain n-person polymatrix games is demonstrated by means of a specific "Selten model." As a byproduct, constructions recently developed for polymatrix games are available for Bayesian equilibria.

Date: 1974
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:21:y:1974:i:3:p:313-315

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