Aspects of One-Stage Voting Rules

Peter C. Fishburn
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Peter C. Fishburn: Pennsylvania State University

Management Science, 1974, vol. 21, issue 4, 422-427

Abstract: Under the assumption that voters have linear preference orders, this study investigates the propensity of simple weighted scoring rules to yield a winning alternative which is the same as the alternative (if any) which would win using a norm rule such as the simple-majority rule or the Borda rule. The scoring rules examined are of the types implemented by ballot instructions such as "vote for two of the following seven alternatives" and "indicate your first (1), second (2), and third (3) choices from the following list of ten candidates." The results, which apply only to situations where one of a number of alternatives is to be chosen on the basis of a single ballot, may be useful in designing balloting and scoring procedures for these types of situations.

Date: 1974
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