Duels with Continuous Firing

John Patrick Lang and George Kimeldorf
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John Patrick Lang: Florida State University
George Kimeldorf: Florida State University

Management Science, 1975, vol. 22, issue 4, 470-476

Abstract: A game-theoretic model is proposed for the generalization of a discrete-fire silent duel to a silent duel with continuous firing. This zero-sum two-person game is solved in the symmetric case. It is shown that pure optimal strategies exist and hence also solve a noisy duel with continuous firing. A solution for the general nonsymmetric duel is conjectured.

Date: 1975
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:22:y:1975:i:4:p:470-476

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