Nash Equilibria in a Sealed Bid Auction

Benjamin T. Smith and James H. Case
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Benjamin T. Smith: Ecole Polytechnique de Montreal
James H. Case: The Johns Hopkins University

Management Science, 1975, vol. 22, issue 4, 487-497

Abstract: The sealed bid auction with two bidders is regarded as a two-person variable sum game. Under perfect information a class of one-parameter distributions emerges as being "best" strategies for either bidder. Under imperfect information, approximations to these strategies lead to Nash equilibrium strategies for both players which are relatively insensitive to unilateral deviation by either of the bidders.

Date: 1975
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