Note--Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed

M. Weverbergh
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M. Weverbergh: Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium

Management Science, 1979, vol. 25, issue 3, 291-294

Abstract: This note reanalyzes the following problem, formerly treated by Wilson (Wilson, R. B. 1967. Competitive bidding with asymmetric information. Management Sci. 13 (July) 816-820): two parties have to submit bids for an object One of them knows the value with certainty, the other does not. The equilibrium derived differs from Wilson's solution and yields a simple explanation for the case cited by Wilson: the value of the game is essentially zero for the party with incomplete information.

Keywords: games/group decisions: bidding; games/group decisions: gambling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1979
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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