Comment---Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games: Comments on Kadane and Larkey's Paper

John Harsanyi

Management Science, 1982, vol. 28, issue 2, 120-124

Abstract: The normative solution concepts of game theory try to provide a clear mathematical characterization of what it means to act rationally in a game where all players expect each other to act rationally. Kadane and Larkey reject the use of these normative solution concepts. Yet, this amounts to throwing away an important piece of information to the effect that the players are rational and expect each other to be rational. Even in situations where the players do not expect each other to act with complete rationality, normative game theory can help them heuristically to formulate reasonable expectations about the other players' behavior.

Keywords: game theory; rationality; Bayesianism; subjective probabilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1982
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