A Note on the Room-Mates Problem and a Related Revenue Allocation Problem

Daniel Granot
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Daniel Granot: Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Y8

Management Science, 1984, vol. 30, issue 5, 633-643

Abstract: We introduce in this note the consistent organizational structure (COS) problem, which can be viewed as a generalization of the college admission and room-mates problems. Both the room-mates problem and the COS problem may have no stable solution. When side payments are allowed, the COS problem, but not the room-mates problem, always has a nonempty core. We further study some nucleoli of the COS problem with side payments.

Keywords: game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1984
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:30:y:1984:i:5:p:633-643

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